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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Tensions between China and Japan have ratcheted up in recent years 
to the point where their territorial dispute over islands in the East 
China Sea is seen as among the region’s most dangerous flashpoints. 
The prospect of Sino-Japanese conflict over these islands is one that 
cannot be taken lightly by Australia. Economically, three of our four 
leading trading partners are located in Northeast Asia, while sea 
lanes vital to Australian trade run through the waters of the East 
China Sea. Strategically and politically, two US allies are based in this 
region and America retains a strong forward military presence there.
This paper starts from the premise that insufficient attention has 
been given to the potential ramifications for Australia of conflict 
in the East China Sea, particularly in terms of whether Australia’s 
alliance obligations with the United States could embroil Canberra 
in a conflict. The paper is motivated in part by Defence Minister 
Johnston’s June 2014 remarks stating that the ANZUS alliance would 
not commit Australia to a conflict where the US had sent forces to 
support Japan. While reminiscent of remarks made a decade earlier 
by then-Foreign Minister Alexander Downer in relation to the prospect 
of Australian involvement via ANZUS in a Taiwan contingency, 
Johnston’s assessment has not attracted anywhere near the same 
level of attention and analysis as those made by Downer in August 
2004.
The purpose of this paper is to begin to fill this gap in Australia’s 
public and policy debate by analysing the circumstances under which 
conflict in the East China Sea could occur and the implications thereof 
for Australia. The paper answers three questions:
1. What does Australia’s alliance relationship with the US commit 
Canberra to in the event of conflict in the East China Sea?
2. What are the risks that Australia faces as a result of ANZUS and 
other associated international commitments?
3. What can be done to better understand and manage these 
risks?
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Part of the analysis involves the exploration of three hypothetical East 
China Sea conflict scenarios. They are not the only circumstances 
under which conflict could develop, just those which this paper judges 
to be most likely. In the first, an exchange of fire involving Chinese 
and Japanese air patrols occurs following a decision by Beijing to 
enforce militarily the Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) which it 
established in November 2013. The second involves an accidental 
clash between a Chinese submarine and a US destroyer that takes 
place during a trilateral military exercise between America, Japan 
and Australia. The third involves non-state actors and stems from an 
incident at sea between a commercial cruise ship carrying a large 
proportion of retired Chinese military officers and the Japanese Coast 
Guard in waters near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.
The paper identifies five facets of escalation that will shape if and how 
Australia would become drawn into a potential conflict:
1. Who initiates? When a conflict is clearly instigated by one side 
Australia will face a much more stark set of choices. An episode 
where highly aggressive Chinese behaviour has sparked conflict 
is, for instance, more likely to elicit Australian involvement than 
one where the circumstances around the eruption of conflict 
are murkier.
2. How does the US respond? This is the greatest determinant of 
Australian involvement. An East China Sea conflict is very unlikely 
to lead to an automatic invocation of ANZUS. But because of the 
strong links established between Washington and Canberra in 
recent years as well as the expanded strategic purpose of the 
alliance, if America expects Australian involvement then it will 
be very difficult to remain on the sidelines.
3. Does Japan request assistance? Australia has also been 
developing a closer strategic relationship with Japan. Next 
to the US, Australia would be among the first to whom Tokyo 
would turn for support in the event of conflict in the East China 
Sea. This has increased the prospects of Australia being caught 
up in a possible conflict.
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4. What costs can China impose? Australia’s approach to conflict 
in the East China Sea will also be shaped by how China responds 
and what leverage it can exert. As Chinese wealth and power 
grows, the PRC will have more ways in which it can impose 
costs on Australia.
5. How much freedom of manoeuvre will Canberra have? The 
involvement of Australian nationals in any contingency, the 
impact of social media, US alliance expectations, as well as 
statements and positions that Australian policymakers adopt in 
the lead up to any crisis will condition how much freedom of 
manoeuvre Canberra has if and when crisis strikes.
The paper concludes with the following five recommendations for 
Australia in managing the risk of involvement and preventing conflict 
escalation:
1. The principal challenge for Australia lies in maintaining 
maximum freedom of policy manoeuvre in the event conflict 
erupts in the East China Sea. This means ensuring that Australia 
does not overcommit too soon, thus taking a position in which it 
unnecessarily pays a price with Beijing. For Canberra the main 
piece of policy preparation lies in managing the expectations of 
the US and Japan in the event of conflict.
2. Australia should work alongside others with a stake in an East 
China Sea conflict, both the direct protagonists as well as others 
who could be negatively affected, to develop better mechanisms 
for managing crises in the East China Sea.
3. A first step to reducing the chances of conflict is to improve 
communication about exactly where the protagonists stand, 
what their red lines are and what consequences will follow from 
crossing those red lines.
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4. A related measure is to begin to develop a series of mechanisms 
that can act as diplomatic ‘off-ramps’ to take the heat out of 
incidents as they occur and provide disputants with ways out of 
escalation dilemmas. One such measure may be a strengthening 
of the recently-signed Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea 
(CUES).
5. Australia should work with others in the region to improve 
the prospects of a resolution process for the East China Sea 
dispute. One way to advance this longer run goal is to establish 
of a new second track process dedicated to the East China Sea 
disputes and linked to the ADMM+ process. Australia could play 
a leading role in initiating this new process in partnership with 
other regional stakeholders.
Chinese President 
Xi Jinping shakes hands with 
Australian Prime Minister 
Tony Abbott before a meeting at 
the Great Hall of the People in 
Beijing, China - 11 April 2014.
EPA/Parker Song
9 CONFLICT IN THE EAST CHINA SEA: WOULD ANZUS APPLY?
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors are very grateful to the many people who have helped 
in the production of this paper. In particular we would like to thank 
Bob Carr for commissioning the project, helping to shape its structure 
and for his many contributions to the final product.
We would particularly like to thank the following for their vital input 
and insight: Sam Bateman, John Blaxland, Malcolm Cook, Bates 
Gill, Allan Gyngell, Linda Jackobson, Amy King, Michael L’Estrange, 
Brendan O’Connor, James Goldrick, James Reilly, Richard Rigby, 
Tom Switzer, Hugh White, as well as a number of government officials 
who spoke to us off the record. 
We are also enormously indebted to the fantastic support we receive 
from the team at ACRI, particularly Daniel Bolger and Elena Collinson, 
from La Trobe Asia’s Diana Heatherich and from the Australian 
National University’s Andrew Carr and Kerrie Hogan.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
CONFLICT IN THE EAST CHINA SEA: WOULD ANZUS APPLY? 10
ACRONYMS
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ABC Australian Broadcasting Corporation
ADF Australian Defence Force
ADIZ Air Defence Identification Zone
ADMM+ ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting ‘Plus’ process
ANZUS Australia New Zealand and United States 
 Security Treaty
CNOOC China National Offshore Oil Corporation
CUES Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea
EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone
HADR Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
JASDF Japan’s Air Self Defence Force
LDP Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
MFA China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs
PKO Peace Keeping Operations
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force
PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy
QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
SDF Japan’s Self Defence Force
TSD Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (Australia, US, Japan)

CONFLICT IN THE EAST CHINA SEA: WOULD ANZUS APPLY? 12
“The East China Sea 
disputes have since 
taken on a worrying 
military dimension.”
WHY THE EAST CHINA SEA MATTERS TO AUSTRALIA
CHAPTER 1
WHY THE EAST CHINA SEA MATTERS TO 
AUSTRALIA
Tensions in the waters of the East China Sea have risen so markedly 
in recent years that this body of water is widely referred to as one of 
East Asia’s most dangerous and combustible ‘flashpoints.’1 While the 
animosities between Beijing and Tokyo which lie at the heart of the 
antagonism date back more than a century to the first Sino-Japanese 
war of 1894-1895, the recent spike in tensions can be traced to a 
collision between a Chinese fishing trawler and a Japanese Coast 
Guard vessel in September 2010.2 This clash sparked a diplomatic 
standoff between Beijing and Tokyo after Japan arrested the captain 
of the vessel and held him in custody for more than two weeks. The 
waters of the East China Sea became even choppier in September 
2012 when Tokyo purchased three of the disputed Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands from their private Japanese owner. Tokyo claimed this as a 
stabilizing move designed to head off an attempt by the nationalist 
mayor of Tokyo, Shintaro Ishihara, from using municipal funds to 
purchase the islands. Beijing quickly became irate over what it 
perceived to be a brazen attempt on Tokyo’s part to change the status 
quo in the East China Sea, and contrary to a 1978 agreement between 
the two sides to shelve the dispute with a view to future resolution.3 
The nationalization of the disputed islands provoked large-scale anti-
Japanese protests in more than 100 Chinese cities.4
The East China Sea disputes have since taken on a worrying military 
dimension. In late 2012, for instance, China penetrated Japanese 
airspace over the disputed islands for the first time since 1958, 
prompting Tokyo to scramble F-15 fighters in response. Japanese 
scrambles against Chinese (and Russian) fighters have risen to record 
levels during the period since. In July 2014, the Japanese Defence 
Ministry announced that it had undertaken 232 scrambles against 
Chinese planes during the first half of the year, up 51 percent from 
2013 levels.5 During the first half of 2014 there have also been reports 
of Chinese and Japanese military planes flying dangerously close 
(i.e. within 30 metres) to each other. Similarly, in early 2013 vessels 
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Chinese surveillance ship, 
rear centre, sails near 
Uotsuri island in Japanese, or 
Diaoyu Dao in Chinese, 
the biggest island in the disputed 
Senkaku Islands, or Diaoyu 
Islands. Japan - July 1 2013.
AP Photo/Kyodo News
from the Chinese Navy allegedly locked their ‘fire control radar’ onto 
a Japanese destroyer and ship-based helicopter in two separate 
incidents. Similar incidents reportedly occurred again in mid-2014. 
The locking of fire control radar is a particularly provocative act in 
that it is the step which immediately precedes opening fire on another 
vessel.6
Incidents such as these, and the broader escalation of tensions in 
the East China Sea, have prompted policymakers and pundits alike 
to talk up the prospects for Sino-Japanese conflict over the disputed 
Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. In early 2014, a US Navy Intelligence official 
went on record suggesting that China is preparing for a ‘short, sharp 
war’ intended to destroy Japanese forces in the East China Sea so as 
to seize the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.7 Australian scholar Hugh White 
has argued that war over the disputed islands is a very real prospect 
and that such a conflict could easily become protracted as it would be 
very difficult to contain.8 James Holmes of the US Naval War College 
has also argued that war between China and Japan could start in 
the East China Sea and spiral into a much larger conflagration. As 
Holmes explains, that is because ‘this competition is about more than 
islets and ADIZs. Nothing less than the nature of Asian order is at 
stake.’9
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East China Sea.
Source: U.S. Department of State
The prospect of conflict in the East China Sea should be deeply 
worrying from Canberra’s perspective. China and Japan are currently 
Australia’s leading two-way trading partners, meaning that any clash 
between them could prove economically destabilizing while major 
conflict would have a disastrous impact on Australian trade. South 
Korea, Australia’s fourth largest two-way trading partner, is also 
embroiled in the East China Sea disputes.10 This is not only due to 
its geographic proximity to China and Japan, but also because Seoul 
contests territory in the East China Sea with both Beijing and Tokyo. 
South Korea and Japan remain in disagreement over islands which 
Seoul calls Dokdo and which Tokyo refers to as Takeshima. Similarly, 
South Korea claims the Ieodo reef, which China also contests and 
refers to as the Suyan Reef. To be sure, these disputes are not as 
likely to erupt into all out hostilities as those over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands. However, they can still lead to international tensions, as 
occurred in November 2013 when Beijing controversially announced 
a new Air Defence Identification Zone over the East China Sea - an 
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“the strategic 
significance of the 
East China Sea 
extends beyond its 
economic importance 
to Australia.”
initiative which angered Seoul because it overlapped with South 
Korea’s own ADIZ and sat above the disputed Ieodo/Suyan Reef.11
Vital sea lanes also run through the East China Sea, with potential 
implications for Australia’s economic security. In recent years, the 
fact that approximately 60 percent of Australian trade moves through 
the waters of the South China Sea has been used to highlight the 
economic and strategic significance of this body of water.12 
A case can be made that the East China Sea is similarly important 
to Australia’s economic wellbeing. Australian shipping to Northern 
China and to South Korea, for instance, transits through the East China 
Sea. Perhaps even more importantly, Australia’s leading East Asian 
trading partners rely heavily on the East China Sea. The transpacific 
trade of both China and South Korea passes through these waters, 
while Japanese shipping relies upon them to reach major Chinese 
markets. As Michael Auslin of the American Enterprise Institute 
observes: ‘From the major ports of Inchon and Pusan in South Korea, 
as well as from Fuzhou, Ningbo, Qingdao, Shanghai and Wenzhou in 
China, access to the Pacific Ocean passes through Japan’s Ryukyu 
island chain and the Miyako and Osumi Straits in particular.’13
Yet the strategic significance of the East China Sea extends beyond 
its economic importance to Australia. This was made clear in April 
2014, when US President Barack Obama stated, while on route to 
Asia, that the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands were covered under the US-
Japan security treaty.14 While senior US officials had conveyed similar 
commitments previously, the fact that a sitting President made the 
pledge gave it added weight.
Very little attention has thus far been given to whether Australia’s 
longstanding alliance with the United States - or, for that matter, 
Canberra’s burgeoning relationship with Tokyo - might potentially 
entangle Australia in the East China Sea imbroglio. This contrasts 
sharply with the, at times robust, debates which occurred in years 
gone by over whether the ANZUS alliance would apply in the case 
of a Taiwan Strait contingency. For example, speaking in 1999 at the 
Australian-American Leadership Dialogue - only two years before he 
was appointed as Deputy Secretary of State in the George W. Bush 
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administration - Richard Armitage stated that ‘Australia would have 
to choose between siding with China in its dispute over Taiwanese 
sovereignty or siding with America as Taiwan’s protector.’15 Only five 
years later, however, Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer 
stated during a doorstop interview while in Beijing that the ANZUS 
Treaty would not necessarily apply in the case of a Taiwan contingency. 
Downer’s remarks were widely criticized in Australia for undermining 
the alliance with the United States and for raising the prospects 
for conflict across the Taiwan Strait.16 They even elicited a public 
rebuke from Washington stating that Australia’s ANZUS obligations 
were clear.17 While the Howard government was swift in distancing 
itself from Downer’s remarks, these continued to engender much 
debate back home in Australia as to whether they marked a genuine 
recalibration in foreign policy or merely a mis-statement on the part 
of the Foreign Minister.
This is not to suggest that the current Abbott government has not 
taken a strong position on the East China Sea.18 At a September 
2013 meeting of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD), for instance, 
Canberra joined Tokyo and Washington in jointly expressing their 
opposition to ‘the use of coercion to change the status quo in the 
East China Sea.’ Foreign Minister Julie Bishop repeated this same 
formulation in November 2013 - when Canberra also summoned 
the Chinese Ambassador to Australia, Ma Zhaoxu - to express 
Australian concerns regarding Beijing’s declaration of a new ADIZ 
U.S. Secretary of State 
John Kerry poses with 
Australian Foreign Minister 
Julie Bishop, and Japanese 
Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida 
before the Trilateral Security 
Dialogue in Bali, Indonesia - 
4 October 2013. 
William Ng/State Department
17 CONFLICT IN THE EAST CHINA SEA: WOULD ANZUS APPLY?
“it is disconcertingly 
plausible that the 
East China Sea dispute 
could escalate into 
a conflict involving 
Japan, the US and 
China.”
over the East China Sea. While Bishop subsequently received a public 
dressing down from her Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, during a visit 
to Beijing during the same month, Canberra has remained robust in 
its approach towards the East China Sea. Bishop outlined the logic for 
doing so at the time of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s historic 
July 2014 visit to Australia, reportedly saying to Fairfax correspondent 
John Garnaut that ‘China does not respect weakness....So, when 
something affects our national interest then we should make it very 
clear about where we stand.’19
Yet such comments contrast strikingly with those made by Defence 
Minister David Johnston in a June 2014 interview on the ABC 
network’s Lateline show, during which he stated his belief that the 
ANZUS alliance would not commit Australia to a conflict where the 
US had sent forces to support its Japanese ally in a confrontation with 
China over the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands.20 While reminiscent 
of Downer’s 2004 remarks, Johnston’s statement did not create 
anywhere near the same level of controversy. Tom Switzer of the 
US Studies Centre at the University of Sydney observes that no one, 
‘including the Prime Minister’, has clarified Johnston’s comments.21 
The Australian Labor Party’s Michael Danby was seemingly a voice 
in the wilderness when criticising Johnston for ‘pulling the rug 
from under the feet of our mutual defence obligations to the US’ 
by signaling to China ‘a deep reticence within the highest levels of 
the current Australian government over whether we would come to 
America’s aid in some future conflict.’22
In fairness to Minister Johnston, he did go on to explain during the 
Lateline interview that ‘we would need to know all of the nuances 
of each of the circumstances and the situation more broadly 
before a decision was made.’ While one would anticipate that such 
circumstances and situations are contemplated on a regular basis 
within parts of the Australian public service, there has been a 
noticeable lack of attention given to them in the broader Australian 
public debate. Here attention has tended to focus at the higher 
strategic level and has often been cast in terms of the stark future 
choices that Canberra may or may not be forced to make at an almost 
abstract level of analysis, rather than upon the precise ‘real world’ 
circumstances under which such choices may present themselves 
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and Australia’s options in the event they do. Yet it is disconcertingly 
plausible that the East China Sea dispute could escalate into conflict 
involving Japan, the US and China. Australia’s alliance relationship 
with the US and its growing security links to Japan, which have been 
significantly enhanced in 2014, mean that in the event of some kind 
of contingency it will face a very challenging set of dilemmas given its 
economic links to China.
The purpose of this paper is to explore these dilemmas and to make 
a contribution to public debate about the risks and opportunities 
opened up by Australia’s relations with the US, China and Japan. It 
does so by analysing the circumstances of potential conflict in the 
East China Sea so as to answer the following three questions:
1. What does Australia’s alliance with the US commit it to in the 
event of conflict in the East China Sea?
2.  What are the risks Australia faces as a result of these 
commitments?
3.  What can be done to better understand and manage these 
risks?
The paper begins by setting out the strategic importance of the 
East China Sea to Australia. It then examines the legal, political and 
strategic qualities of ANZUS and Australia’s broader relationship with 
the US. The paper then sets out three hypothetical East China Sea 
conflict scenarios where Australia’s alliance and other international 
commitments may come into play. The scenarios are used to illustrate 
the political and strategic trip wires Australia faces in the East China 
Sea dispute. The subsequent chapter considers the differing dilemmas 
that Australia faces depending on the particular circumstances of 
putative conflict. The paper concludes by highlighting the factors 
which risk escalation and internationalization of conflict in the East 
China Sea and provides a set of policy recommendations to mitigate 
risk and manage regional tensions.
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CHAPTER 2
ANZUS AND AUSTRALIA’S 
COMMITMENTS
The strategic relationship between the US and Australia rests on the 
legal foundations of the ANZUS treaty. Signed in 1951, the treaty was 
part of the raft of legal arrangements that established Asia’s post-
war order including the formal peace treaty signed by the 48 allied 
powers and Japan as well as the US-Japan Security Treaty. The 
document itself, and the broader goals which it sought to achieve, 
were a product of those times. During the Second World War Australia 
perceived that its longer term security interests would be best served 
by developing a closer relationship with the United States. After the 
war, Australia turned to Washington and sought a formal and explicit 
security guarantee. This was motivated by the sense that the peace 
was fragile and its region was one of risk and danger. Foremost in 
mind were the fears of a resurgence of Japanese militarism and 
the expansion of communism across post-colonial Asia. More 
particularly, Australia recognized that its erstwhile protector, the UK, 
was no longer in a position to provide the kinds of protections and 
guarantees Australia felt that it required. Whatever spare capacity 
the UK had was committed to the newly created European security 
arrangements centred around NATO.
ANZUS AND AUSTRALIA’S COMMITMENTS
John Foster Dulles, 
the US secretary of state, 
signs the ANZUS treaty in 
San Francisco in 1951, 
surrounded by US politicians 
and diplomats.
Harry S. Truman Library 
and Museum 
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“None of America’s 
bilateral agreements 
in Asia have a 
commitment that is 
as strong as NATO’s 
because the US did 
not want to establish 
a series of tripwires 
across the Pacific.”
But Australia did not only seek security and comfort from the new 
alliance with America, it also sought influence. The experiences of 
the two world wars, in which Australia had not been able to have any 
impact on strategic decisions, had left its mark. Australian policy 
makers wanted the opportunity, however slight it may be, to influence 
the region’s pre-eminent power. Without a formal treaty and the 
ongoing policy coordination that it entailed Australia would have 
almost no chance to shape Washington’s choices.
During the negotiations to finalize the text, Australia made plain that 
it wanted an explicit commitment to collective security principles 
of the kind found in the North Atlantic Treaty. Article V of NATO’s 
foundational document requires all members to treat an armed attack 
on one as an attack on all and to act to restore peace and security.23 
Yet Washington was uneasy about this and resisted Australian efforts 
to elicit such a guarantee.24 None of America’s bilateral agreements 
in Asia have a commitment that is as strong as NATO’s because the 
US did not want to establish a series of tripwires across the Pacific. It 
wanted to be able to dictate the terms of its regional engagement. It 
was also put to Australian negotiators that such terms would make 
the treaty unlikely to be approved by the US Senate.25
ANZUS AND AUSTRALIA’S COMMITMENTS
US President Barack Obama 
shakes hands with Prime Minister 
Tony Abbott of Australia in the 
Oval Office the White House in 
Washington DC - 12 June 2014.
EPA/Ron Sachs
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As a result the text of the ANZUS treaty is deliberately ambiguous. 
The security guarantee is conveyed in Article IV:
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific 
Area on any of the Parties would be dangerous to its own 
peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet 
the common danger in accordance with its constitutional 
processes.26
Each side commits to act in the event of an attack on the other. 
Precisely what ‘act’ means was left open to interpretation but it is 
most emphatically a lesser commitment than NATO members 
undertake. Beyond this operative aspect of the treaty, Article III 
sets out a requirement that the signatories consult together if their 
‘territorial integrity, political independence or security’ is threatened. 
Here, as in Article IV, the treaty is seen in narrow terms, that is relating 
specifically to the territory and standing of the three states and not 
to broader interests they may have or more nebulous goals such 
as regional security. The treaty does, however, include a number of 
references to a broader regional purpose. The preamble positions the 
treaty explicitly as an exercise in collective defence for the purposes 
of broader regional security and states that it is intended to express 
a sense of strategic unity among the parties ‘so that no aggressor 
could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific 
ANZUS AND AUSTRALIA’S COMMITMENTS
Australian Defence Minister 
David Johnston, Australian 
Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, 
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry 
and U.S. Secretary of Defence 
Chuck Hagel speak to the media 
during a press conference at 
the conclusion of the annual 
Australia-US Ministerial 
Consultations (AUSMIN) talks, 
at Admiralty House in Sydney - 
12 August 2014.
AP Photo/Dan Himbrechts
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Area.’27 Article VIII also gives this regional function an institutional 
form noting that the council of ministers established in Article VII: 
‘is authorized to maintain a consultative relationship with States, 
Regional Organizations, Associations of States or other authorities in 
the Pacific Area in a position to further the purposes of this Treaty 
and to contribute to the security of that Area.’28 ANZUS from the 
outset was intended to be part of a larger regional framework, but 
the explicit commitments that the signatories give to one another are 
framed in deliberately broad and ambiguous terms.
In contrast to NATO, in which the political and strategic commitment 
has a strong formal quality, ANZUS is written in such a way that the 
strength of the security agreement is a function of its political attributes 
rather than its textual qualities. Indeed a clear distinction should be 
made between the formal legal obligations of the document and the 
much broader political canvass of the relationship. The agreement is 
the legal foundation for the alliance, but it involves a great deal more.
More than a treaty
Alliances are arrangements that states enter into to increase their 
chances of advancing their respective security interests and are 
normally organized around threats.29 States provide one another 
with security guarantees to improve their collective prospects in the 
face of a specific challenge. Perhaps the archetypal alliance, NATO 
was formed to see off the threat of Soviet conventional superiority in 
Western Europe.
Many alliances have treaties that spell out the nature of the participants’ 
respective commitments. This ensures that the parties understand 
the obligations they take on when joining the alliance. It also helps 
to send signals to would be antagonists about just what it is that 
they face. But not all alliances entail such written communication. 
One of the closest strategic relationships in the contemporary world, 
that between the United States and Israel, has no formal agreement 
setting out its purpose or respective commitments. Yet few doubt the 
resolve of both parties with regard the other’s interests. In most cases 
the substance of an alliance relationship is always more than that 
which is included in the text of treaties.
ANZUS AND AUSTRALIA’S COMMITMENTS
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The formal terms of treaties should not be mistaken as encompassing 
a security relationship’s totality. This is especially so if their terms 
are vague or the commitments ambiguous as in the case of ANZUS. 
Alliances are fundamentally political arrangements whose standing 
at any given time is a function of the mutual expectations and 
commitments of their members. What these entail and their relative 
strength vary over time as they are subjected to shifting domestic 
political and geostrategic pressures.
What are the mutual expectations and commitments of the US-
Australia alliance at present? The treaty clearly dictates that both will 
take action to come to the aid of the other if their core interests are 
under attack. ANZUS arrangements have only been formally invoked 
once since 1951 and that was in response to the terrorist attacks of 
September 2001. But beyond this basic and well understood promise 
of Article IV, the Australia-US relationship involves a range of other 
commitments and expectations which are shaped by four main forces. 
These are: communication between the parties, past behaviour, basic 
capacity and shared interests and values.
Much of the communication that is undertaken between Canberra 
and Washington goes on behind closed doors and scholars will have 
to wait for the unlocking of the archives to discover what exactly was 
said. But public remarks should be, and indeed are intended to be 
read for what they say about not only the matter at hand but about the 
nature and extent of the broader commitments each makes to the 
other. Perhaps the most notable feature of recent remarks about the 
alliance by senior political figures is the extent to which it is presented 
as something that contributes substantively to regional stability. In 
AUSMIN declarations, President Obama’s famous ‘pivot’ speech to 
the Australian Parliament in 2011, and in joint press conferences, the 
alliance is described as something which serves not only the narrow 
interests of the two parties, but which underpins the overarching 
peace and stability of the region. In the 2013 AUSMIN communiqué, 
the alliance is described as ‘an anchor of peace and stability in the 
Asia-Pacific region and beyond.’30 While the 2014 version ‘reaffirmed 
the Alliance’s important contribution to the peace, security, and 
prosperity of the Asia Pacific and Indian Ocean regions as well as its 
enduring value in addressing contemporary and evolving challenges 
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in the regions and throughout the world.’31 It is reasonable to infer 
that this is more than rhetoric deployed to burnish public statements 
and that it reflects an underlying belief in the role and purpose of 
the alliance arrangements. Australia and the US will work to manage 
regional peace and security and will, by implication, react when 
challenges to that emerge. Precisely what ‘react’ means is, of course, 
not clear.
Communication is by no means the only way of determining levels 
of expectation and commitment. While past performance is no 
guarantee of future action, it nonetheless provides some sense of 
the likelihood of activity. Australia has participated in every military 
contingency in which the US has sought its assistance since World 
War II. In almost every case the decision to participate was driven in 
the main by alliance considerations. Beyond the rhetoric of shared 
values and interests driving Australian involvement in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, the prime calculus shaping these commitments was 
the belief that maintenance of the alliance required participation.32 To 
put it bluntly, Australian decision-makers have seen involvement in 
conflict as a premium that needs to be paid for the security guarantee 
and other benefits Australia accrues from its relationship with the 
US. For Australia such an activist past has been vital to developing the 
strong and close relationship that exists today. But its implications for 
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in the region.”
future contingencies is mixed. On the one hand, Australian alliance 
managers could use its strong past contribution as a way of passing 
the buck in the future. Australia has paid its dues, this argument 
might go, its reliability and commitment to the alliance is assured so 
it will be more able to avoid entrapment. It is easy to see why such a 
tactic may not be appealing. As with all forms of insurance, alliance 
arrangements require regular and up to date payment of premiums.
The flip side of the strength of past commitments is that it makes 
reducing or avoiding premium payments much harder. This is 
particularly true if contingencies were in Australia’s immediate region. 
Australia’s history of strong commitment provides an expectation 
in Washington of a continuation of that level of premium. When 
this is added to how much Australia receives from its alliance with 
Washington, in terms of intelligence, defence technology and political 
access,33 it is reasonable to think that Washington has relatively 
high levels of expectation of Australian contributions to any military 
contingencies in the region.
Expectations are also built on perceptions of shared interests. Although 
alliances have historically been precipitated by military threats, their 
ongoing existence reflects not just concerns about immediate ways in 
which the parties are threatened but also by a sense of interests which 
they share. Understanding their importance and evolution over time 
provides a crucial sense of the underlying life of the alliance and what 
expectations partners have of one another. For Australia and the US, 
the shared interests in the alliance operate at three levels. The first 
relates to the core understanding of mutual defence. Each sees the 
other’s survival and integrity as sufficiently important to make a treaty 
commitment to that end. The second, relates to a shared interest in 
the stability and security of what was in 1951 referred to as the Pacific 
but is now referred to as the Asia-Pacific.34 Here one can distinguish 
between specific regional interests, such as ensuring the sea lines 
of communication are kept open, and broader concerns such as 
maintaining the current regional order. While the third level relates 
to the global context in which the alliance is now thought to operate. 
Where in the past the alliance was conceived in a relatively narrow 
geographic context, in both its operational and strategic purposes 
the US and Australia conceive of their shared interests and threats 
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were not pulling their 
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as having a global purview. The three dimensions of these interests 
and the extent to which these have taken on a growing importance in 
both the rhetoric of the alliance as well as its planning and operations 
mean that the expectations of alliance commitment have increased 
for Australia over the past decade or so. The problem with questions 
of shared interest and in particular how they are perceived lies in their 
inherent imprecision. Just how strong these shared interests are is 
necessarily opaque.
In any alliance the question of basic capability plays a crucial role in 
shaping mutual expectations. This is especially the case in alliances 
between large and relatively smaller powers. Just how much you 
can be expected to contribute will be a function of what it is you are 
capable of contributing. The question of sharing capabilities is one of 
the most difficult aspects of alliance management as there is always 
a strong temptation for the lesser power to piggyback on the larger 
power’s military might. American alliance managers have long felt 
that European states were not contributing to the military basis of 
NATO to the extent to which they could. Even in Asia there has been 
a feeling that states were doing as little as they could to ensure US 
commitment. This sentiment became publicly evident in the wake of 
the 2007-08 financial crisis. A fiscally challenged US was concerned 
that its allies, especially those doing well out of the China boom, were 
not pulling their weight.35 Thus for any state involved in an alliance 
defence acquisition programs are fundamentally bound up in the 
politics of alliance management.
In the 2009 and 2013 Defence White Papers, the Australian government 
signalled a desire to increase the ADF’s capacity to project force beyond 
Australia’s immediate territories.36 Here the acquisition of large attack 
submarines, air-warfare destroyers and F-35s is driven in part by the 
need to service alliance commitments in the region. Clearly, Australia 
is not now nor is it going to be a major contributor to any significant 
conflict in the region. Nonetheless, it has the ability and resources 
to make ‘niche’ contributions to regional contingencies. Australia’s 
capability to participate in alliance activity may not be a great as some 
would like, but it is already able to do a good deal and is planning to do 
more in the future. This sends very clear signals to Washington and 
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“Australia has made 
clear over a long 
period of time the 
priority it attaches to 
the United States. ”
beyond about the alliance relationship and Australia’s expectations 
and commitments.
Both in the formal, legal qualities of the treaty which underpins the 
relationship, and in the substantive actions, ideas and commitments 
that animate the alliance, Australia has made clear over a long 
period of time the priority it attaches to the United States. Over the 
past fifteen years or so, this relationship has been tightened and its 
function expanded to support regional and global security interests. 
In so doing Australia has not only ensured that the US is more likely 
to respond to security challenges by which Australia feels threatened, 
but it has increased the level of expectation on Australia to contribute 
to alliance commitments. Precisely what that entails will depend on 
the circumstances in question but one must be very clear that the 
substance of the strategic link to the US involves a good deal more 
than a narrow textual interpretation of a treaty signed in 1951.
A Complex Regional Context
For Australian political leaders, changing regional circumstances 
have made calculations about alliance commitments more complex 
than in the past. The biggest and most contentious relates to 
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Australia’s economic relationship with China. But to this one can also 
add Australia’s growing defence and security links to Japan.
China’s Transformation
The economic development of China that began with the Four 
Modernizations reform program in the late 1970s has transformed 
China. The broad trends are well known: China has gone from being 
a closed economy that could barely feed its own population to the 
world’s largest producer of steel, concrete, and manufactured goods, 
with the world’s second largest GDP. This has transformed the basic 
structure of Asia’s economy; it has begun to draw the states and 
societies of the region into a more coherent regional economic order 
and has had remarkable consequences for the world.
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China’s modernization has had a profound effect on the Australian 
economy. The rapid industrialization and urbanization of Chinese 
society has created huge demand for Australian commodities such 
as iron ore and coal. As a result of this, since 2007 China has been 
Australia’s number one trade partner. In the financial year 2012-13, 
China was the destination for nearly one-third of Australian exports 
worth about $78 billion. To put this transformation in historical 
perspective, in 1972, trade was worth a little over USD 86 million.37 
Even with the recent slowdown in the Chinese economy, trade has 
continued to grow. China is also an important source of investment. 
Australia has been the top destination for FDI sourced from the PRC 
since the mid-2000s.38 Investment in Australia has boomed on the 
back of the Chinese government’s ‘Going Global’ policy initiated in 
the mid-2000s. Driven by a range of factors, from resource security 
to a desire to learn to do business in a developed economy, Chinese 
investment is overwhelmingly focused in the primary commodities 
sector with more than 90% of it in the mining, oil and gas sectors.39 
Chinese investment in Australia is expected to grow significantly in 
the coming years.
Some believe that the importance of China to the Australian economy 
has meant that the basic assumptions that have informed Australian 
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strategic policy need to be rethought.40 In the past, Australian economic 
and strategic interests have had a happy convergence. While Britain 
was Australia’s preeminent economic partner, through roughly until 
the Second World War, it was also its paramount strategic guarantor. 
The move to establish the alliance with the US was in the first instance 
a calculation that America would be the Pacific’s most important 
military force but it also continued the trend whereby the economic 
and strategic were in harmony. When Japan became the country’s 
largest export destination in 1967 and its top trade partner in 1971, its 
own partnership with Washington ensured that the kinds of strategic 
uncertainty that this might have created did not eventuate. Now, 
Australia has a great deal at stake in the incipient rivalry between the 
US and China.
The Tokyo Connection
On the back of collaboration in post invasion Iraq and the 2004 
Boxing Day Tsunami and propelled by a shared sense of the need 
for America’s allies to begin to do more with one another, Australia 
and Japan have begun to develop a close security relationship. This 
has involved both formal elements, with four agreements relating 
to security cooperation signed since 2007, as well as a wide range 
Visiting Australian Prime Minister 
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Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe prior to their talks at the 
Prime Minister’s official residence 
in Tokyo - 13 March 2007.
AFP Photo/AFP Pool/ 
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of interactions including regular bilateral meetings of ministers, ad 
hoc military exercises down to officer exchanges and defence college 
participation.
The formal elements reflect most clearly the effort by both 
governments to do more and to be seen to be doing more together. 
The 2007 signing of the Joint Security Declaration was considered 
a watershed moment in the bilateral relationship. It was the first 
agreement Japan had signed on security matters with a partner other 
than the United States since the second world war. The agreement 
essentially formalised a range of areas in which the two had worked 
in the past and stated their intent to regularize cooperation on specific 
areas of security policy in the region and beyond.41 The agreement’s 
real weight was the signal it sent rather than the collaboration it 
created.42 In 2010 the two signed an agreement establishing formal 
mechanisms facilitating concrete operational interaction between 
the SDF and the ADF. This turned the diplomatic statement of 
intent of 2007 into practical action, albeit in relatively constrained 
situations.43 This was followed by the conclusion of an information 
security agreement in 2012 which provided a legal framework for the 
sharing of secret information and its security.44 This confirmed what 
many had thought after the 2007 agreement, that Australia and Japan 
were in the process of exchanging intelligence and other classified 
information to advance their common interests. Most recently, during 
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 2014 visit to Australia, Canberra and 
Tokyo signed the Defence and Technology Transfer Agreement.45 
Beyond further signalling the linkages between the two defence 
and security communities it was also intended to help manage the 
legal and political sensitivities around Japan’s defence industries 
which, while advanced and competitive, have been fenced off from 
international trade due to domestic political factors.
When put alongside the active collaboration of bilateral ministerial 
efforts, military exercises, including the US-Japan-Australia air force 
drills out of Guam, and a host of other military to military exercises 
it is plain that Australia and Japan have been developing links that 
are both symbolic and substantive. The aim is to develop processes 
and mechanisms in which the two can do more, particularly in 
Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) and Humanitarian Assistance and 
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Disaster Relief (HADR) activity, as well as to service their alliance 
commitments. But the symbolic aspect should not be downplayed. 
Australia and Japan have sent consistent and strong signals that 
they see their regional and indeed global security interests as very 
closely aligned. This steady and bipartisan effort has been ratcheted 
up in intensity since the election of Prime Minister Abbott in Australia. 
Clearly the two conservative nationalist leaders have a good rapport 
and their instincts about regional security concerns are very similar. In 
particular, the language and activities of the Australian government, 
from Abbott’s declaration that Japan was Australia’s closest friend in 
Asia through to its backing of Japan’s position in relation to China’s 
East China Sea ADIZ, Australia has very publically drawn its interests 
much closer to Japan’s.  The choice of language used by Foreign 
Minister Bishop’s press release in this latter example was telling: 
‘Australia has made clear its opposition to any coercive or unilateral 
actions to change the status quo in the East China Sea.’46 The point is 
that the dispute centres on just what the status quo actually entails. 
China argues that Japan unjustly acquired administrative control of 
the islands in the 1970s and in nationalising them in 2012 it disrupted 
the status quo. The language chosen by the Foreign Minister involves 
Australia taking a position supportive of Japan.
Canberra’s strengthening relations with Tokyo are pertinent to this 
paper’s discussion of the East China Sea in two ways. First, Australia 
has positioned itself as supporting Japan’s view that anything that 
China does in relation to the islands is upsetting the status quo and 
thus implying that China’s actions are aggressive and destabilizing. 
This builds expectations of support from Tokyo and can be seen by 
Beijing as Australia backing Japan’s position.  Second, Australia’s 
actions can be perceived to suggest a shared interest with Japan in the 
standing of the islands and that it has a stake in the dispute itself. Thus 
when thinking about the risks of entanglement in possible conflict 
scenarios in the East China Sea, the risks and expectations of activity 
are not only going to emanate from Washington; the Tokyo connection 
adds a further layer of complexity to Canberra’s considerations.
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CHAPTER 3
CONFLICT SCENARIOS 
Introductory Remarks
In the first part of the Cold War the Asian region was notable for being 
home to that contest’s major wars. High intensity warfare first on 
the Korean Peninsula then in Indochina made East Asia the world’s 
bloodiest region. Yet even though conflict declined dramatically after 
the Sino-American rapprochement of the mid-1970s, the region has 
remained fraught with risk. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
the places where great power conflict seemed likeliest were in East 
Asia. The geopolitical standoff on the Korean peninsula and Taiwan’s 
defiance of Beijing’s claims were the two most prominent tripwires 
that might bring the US and China to blows. For reasons outlined in 
the opening chapter of this paper, to this list must today be added the 
risk of conflict emanating from a clash in the East China Sea. Indeed 
the risk of this occurring is arguably greater now than the two long 
running regional fault lines in part because the novelty of heightened 
Sino-Japanese rivalry means that escalation control is less well 
established, if at all, communication lines in case of emergency are 
poor and expectations are uncertain.
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In this section, the paper explores three scenarios in which conflict 
in the East China Sea might develop. The scenarios are designed to 
explore the vectors of potential conflict and they do this by focusing on 
differing trigger points and exploring variable conflict dynamics. The 
scenarios occur over the short to medium term and the narratives 
end at the initial point of escalation. While the broader aim of the 
project is to think through how conflict may emerge in East Asia so 
as to take steps to try to make the plausible less so, the specific goal 
is to identify the risks Australia faces in being caught up in escalating 
conflict so that Canberra can better prepare to mitigate and manage 
these risks. These scenarios have been developed in such a way 
that Australia has to make meaningful decisions in response to the 
conflict and the narrative has stopped short of a dramatic escalation 
into high-intensity conflict.
SCENARIO 1. 
ADIZ ENFORCEMENT: CHINA MAKES GOOD ON ITS WORD
Background
Beijing’s new East China Sea ADIZ is contiguous to the Chinese coast 
line and overlaps with parts of ADIZs belonging to Japan and South 
Korea.47 The Chinese government’s requirements for aircraft flying in 
the zone were elaborated in a statement subsequent to the initial ADIZ 
announcement. All aircraft entering the zone are required to lodge 
flight plans with either the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) 
or Civil Aviation Authority and adhere to instructions issued by the 
government. The government asserts that its armed forces will adopt 
‘defensive emergency measures’ in response to non-compliance with 
the rules.48
Beijing’s November 2013 ADIZ announcement was met with 
widespread concern in the region, with the US and its allies criticizing 
China for altering the status quo. The Australian response was 
notably robust, with Canberra formally summoning the Chinese 
Ambassador to Australia, Ma Zhaoxu, to express its concerns.49 In 
immediate response the US sent two unarmed B52 bombers through 
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the zone followed by aircraft from Japan’s Air Self Defence force on 25 
November.50 After not responding to the B52s, China scrambled jets 
in reaction to Japanese aircraft that entered the zone several days 
later. This came against the backdrop of threats from Tokyo, made in 
January 2013, that it may ‘fire warning shots and take other necessary 
measures to keep foreign aircraft from violating its airspace.’51
Nonetheless, as the months have worn on a pattern of sorts has 
emerged as to how others will respond to China’s new ADIZ. Civilian 
aircraft have generally followed the rules as required, although 
Japanese and South Korean aircraft have only done so when China 
is their final destination. Since 2014, PLAAF aircraft have scrambled 
irregularly in response to US and Japanese reconnaissance flights 
in the ADIZ. As a result of this the US, Japan and South Korea have 
come to the belief that the zone is, militarily, an ambit claim and they 
have not altered their attitudes or approach to military over-flight.
During its first year or so of existence, Chinese opinion, both official 
and non-official, has been fairly consistent focusing on three main 
points: (1) articulating the view that the ADIZ is in line with international 
practice; (2) that Japan is the principal destabilising force in the region, 
and (3) deliberately not clarifying what the threatened ‘defensive 
emergency measures’ would actually entail.
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The Scenario
By early 2015, some divisions in official Chinese opinion have started 
to become evident. While the MFA maintains the existing approach, 
the Ministry of National Defence and hawkish commentators from 
PLA-affiliated think tanks and the National Defence University 
have begun to diverge from this position, articulating the need for a 
stronger enforcement of the ADIZ rules. Some of the more assertive 
have said that the ADIZ rules should be revised to sharpen the 
retaliatory threat. An article published in the Global Times newspaper 
by a professor at the National Defense University calls upon Beijing to 
be more ‘creative’ in its diplomacy and to establish a new ADIZ over at 
least part of the South China Sea, with a view to expanding this zone 
as time passes and Chinese military capabilities further improve.
Some observers have linked these developments to signs of discontent 
toward the Chinese President from the military. They believe that there 
is growing frustration among some in the PLA about the President’s 
pragmatism and patience toward Japan and the US. In particular the 
failure to enforce the ADIZ in sufficiently robust terms is thought to 
be embarrassing if not humiliating. Added to this, the President’s 
anti-corruption campaign has alienated many in the military and PLA 
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watchers believe that a right wing anti-President block is beginning 
to form among some senior PLA officials.
In early August 2015 a ‘near miss’ occurs in China’s new ADIZ after 
two Chinese Su-27 planes reportedly fly within 5 metres of a Japanese 
P-3 surveillance flight. Japanese fighters escorting the P-3 flight fire 
warning shots in a successful attempt to ward off the Chinese Su-27s.
The immediate fall out of the incident is a precipitous decline in 
Sino-Japanese relations. The Japanese Prime Minister denounces 
China’s actions in a live national address on television. During these 
remarks he asserts that the Japanese aircraft were within Japan’s 
airspace and that the Chinese fighters had, in fact, violated ‘Japanese 
sovereignty’.
In the address, the Prime Minister also claims that the Chinese aircraft 
had behaved dangerously and unpredictably and that this ‘near miss’ 
was entirely China’s fault. It is a metaphor, in his terms, for ‘Beijing’s 
flagrant disregard of the rule of law.’ He goes on to claim China’s 
actions are part of a carefully calibrated plot designed to challenge 
Japanese sovereignty over its ‘historical territories’.
The Chinese government response is slightly more muted with 
Foreign Ministry spokesmen voicing governmental criticism of Japan. 
The MFA claims that the Japanese aircraft had been in China’s ADIZ, 
that it had not complied with government instructions and that its 
aircraft’s actions had been prompted by evasive manoeuvres by the 
JASDF aircraft.
In the days and weeks that follow the incident, officials publically 
continue to blame the other side. In China, criticism is ratcheted up 
with references to World War II atrocities frequently aired by senior 
officials. Observers believe that the accident has strengthened the 
hand of those within the PLA that want a more assertive stand taken 
in relation to the ADIZ.
Within Japan the incident solidifies political consensus around the 
need to modernise militarily and to further enhance Japan’s capacity 
to respond to contingencies in its far-flung territories. The Prime 
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Minister visits Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August. Following the historical 
increase in defence spending of 2014, the Ministry of Defence details 
a further expansion of spending in 2015 with a widening out of the 
number of F-35s and P-3 Orions being ordered to defend its claims in 
the East China Sea.
The United States strongly supports Japan’s position. In an unusual 
joint press conference in Washington, the US Secretary of State and 
the Secretary of Defense denounce China’s behaviour, and explicitly 
accuse the PRC of ‘trying to change the regional status quo by force.’ 
While not taking sides in territorial disputes, they say that the US 
is opposed to the use of force and opposed to efforts to change the 
status quo. America will therefore take action to ensure that no one 
has an incentive to try to make changes in a non-consensual manner. 
In the weeks that follow, the US and Japan step up the number of 
patrols occurring in and around the East China Sea. These include 
joint aerial patrols as well as an increased deployment of maritime 
units to the waters around the islands.
Within China commentary in public forums has demanded that the 
government sharpen up the ADIZ rules, particularly in the face of 
US pressure. There is also a sense within Beijing that the strong 
US language would not be backed by firm resolve under the current 
President. In late September the government then issues a further 
statement about ADIZ conduct that makes clear China’s intention to 
enforce the zone with lethal force in the event of what it describes 
as ‘provocative action’ by non-compliant aircraft. The US and 
Japan continue to ignore the ADIZ from a military point of view with 
continuation of the stepped up tempo of patrols. China has begun to 
increase its broader military presence in the East China Sea and has 
increased the speed and frequency of interception of these aircraft.
Around four weeks after the new rules have been issued a JASDF 
patrol consisting of two reconnaissance aircraft escorted by two F15s 
are patrolling the southern section of China’s ADIZ. China scrambles 
two fighter jets to intercept the patrol. The PLAAF aircraft are reported 
to have issued instructions to the JASDF aircraft which do not respond. 
The Chinese aircraft close on the Japanese reconnaissance aircraft, 
undertaking what the Japanese government later claims were 
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‘hostile acts’. The JSDF F15 locks its fire control radar on the PLAAF 
jet. The other Chinese aircraft then fires a missile at the Japanese 
jet destroying it, the second F15 returns fire destroying the Chinese 
aircraft.
Within hours of the event, the governments of both Japan and China 
are awash with nationalist sentiment. China argues repeatedly that 
it had clearly indicated the risks of defying its ADIZ rules and that 
Japan has brought this upon itself and that it is to blame as it was 
with the Second World War. The incident leads to a rapid introduction 
of significant Chinese military forces in the East China Sea, including 
the aircraft carrier Liaoning and it is thought a significant submarine 
presence. The US responds by deploying an aircraft carrier battle 
group to the northeast of the islands and has begun to contact allies 
to gather diplomatic support for its defence of Japan’s interests. 
Australia is being actively lobbied by both Washington and Japan for 
diplomatic support of their position and military support in the case 
of a further deterioration of the situation.
SCENARIO 2. 
ACCIDENTAL MILITARY CLASH: PACIFIC POWER GOES 
PEAR-SHAPED
Background
In an increasingly crowded Asian maritime environment, the prospects 
for an accidental military clash are on the rise. Such a clash could 
potentially happen in the air, at sea or underwater. The most high 
profile recent example of this occurred in April 2001, when a US Navy 
EP-3 aircraft conducting what it regarded as a routine surveillance 
mission off the coast of China and over the waters of the South 
China Sea collided with a PLA J-8 fighter. While the Chinese plane 
crashed and the pilot was killed, the American aircraft was forced to 
land on the Chinese island of Hainan, sparking a major diplomatic 
crisis between Beijing and Washington. The 24-man crew aboard 
the EP-3 was held for 11 days, as Washington negotiated its release 
amidst some fears that Beijing may hold them hostage. Securing the 
return of the aircraft itself took a further six weeks of haggling over 
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compensation, by which time the Chinese side had also stripped it of 
any sensitive technology. The prospects for a crisis of similar nature 
occurring today over the East China Sea remain very real, particularly 
as Chinese and Japanese aircraft have been flying dangerously 
close to each other in recent months. Similar trends were becoming 
apparent in interactions between Chinese and American aircraft in 
the months prior to the April 2001 EP-3 crisis.52
Probably the greatest chance of an accidental military clash lies on 
the waters of the East China Sea rather than in the skies above it. 
While such a clash has yet to occur around the disputed Senkaku/
Diaoyu islands, there have been several ‘near misses’ between US 
and Chinese vessels in the adjacent South China Sea. In March 
2009, for instance, five Chinese vessels shadowed and manoeuvred 
dangerously around the ocean surveillance ship USNS Impeccable 
while it was conducting operations south of Hainan Island, most likely 
involving the tracking of Chinese submarines. During this episode, 
some of the Chinese vessels intentionally stopped directly in front of 
the Impeccable, forcing the US ship to take evasive action in order to 
avoid a collision.53 A similar but more serious incident occurred in 
December 2013 when an American guided missile frigate, the USS 
Cowpens, was forced to take action to avoid a collision with a Chinese 
CONFLICT SCENARIOS
U.S. Navy EP-3 surveillance plane 
parks on an apron in the rain at 
Kadena Air Base in Okinawa, 
southern Japan.
AP Photo/Itsuo Inouye
CONFLICT IN THE EAST CHINA SEA: WOULD ANZUS APPLY? 42
landing ship. The Cowpens had been monitoring exercises involving 
China’s aircraft carrier Liaoning and several other PLAN surface 
ships in the South China Sea.54
There is a strong likelihood that the frequency of accidental military 
clashes will increase in the years ahead, particularly in the East China 
Sea. As and when they do occur, their management is also likely to 
become increasingly difficult and complex. This is partly due to the 
effects of Asia’s burgeoning military modernization which will enable 
more and more states to become active in military surveillance. 
The number of military exercises is also increasing and with this 
the potential for accidental clashes. Illustrative of these trends is a 
major military exercise between Chinese and Russian forces which 
took place in the East China Sea in May 2014. On this occasion, Seoul 
strengthened its surveillance activities in areas where the Sino-
Russian exercise overlapped with South Korea’s own ADIZ.55
The proliferation of military platforms throughout East Asia is also 
likely to exacerbate these problems. As the respected Australian 
maritime security expert Sam Bateman has observed with reference 
to the growing number of submarine acquisitions in the region: ‘more 
submarines in the narrow seas of the region pose increased risks of 
submarine accidents and of incidents resulting from the detection of 
a submarine engaged on covert operations in disputed waters.’56 In 
June 2009, for instance, a Chinese submarine ‘inadvertently’ collided 
with a sonar array being towed by the US destroyer John McCain.57 
In March 2010, the South Korean corvette Cheonan was sunk by a 
torpedo fired from a North Korean submarine, resulting in the loss of 
46 lives and sparking a crisis on the Korean Peninsula.58
Initiatives to reduce the prospects of an accidental military clash in 
East Asia have been attempted, but these remain in their early stages 
and relatively weak. A recent example is the Code for Unplanned 
Encounters at Sea (CUES), which 21 nations signed at the April 2014 
meeting of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. This is a non-
binding code applying only to navies, which outlines communication 
methods for naval vessels and aircraft when unanticipated encounters 
occur beyond territorial waters. Given the disputed territorial status 
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of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, however, CUES is not thought to apply 
to a contingency in the waters around these.59
Even when confidence building and communications mechanisms 
designed to reduce the prospects for escalation resulting from an 
accidental clash have been developed, these are often not effectively 
implemented. This is certainly the case with a series of such measures 
developed between China and Japan over the past half decade.60 In the 
absence of sufficiently strong and effective mechanisms for avoiding 
accidental military clashes - such as the 1972 agreement between 
the US and the Soviet Union for the ‘avoidance of naval incidents at 
sea’61 - the potential for strategic distrust to continue to grow in East 
Asia is worrying. As Bateman has observed in a reflection upon the 
December 2013 USS Cowpens episode ‘such incidents make China 
“the enemy” for American sailors, and vice versa.’62
The Scenario
It is June 2017. A new Republican President is settling into office in 
the United States. Likened to former President Ronald Reagan, her 
performance on the campaign trail has led to speculation that the 
US will adopt a much harder line in foreign and strategic policy than 
that taken by her predecessor so as to restore America’s flagging 
credibility around the world. Weakness, rather than strength, is also 
emerging as a theme in Chinese and Japanese politics. In China, the 
President’s anti-corruption drive is beginning to attract increasing 
levels of domestic opposition, particularly within senior elements of 
the PLA. In Japan, commentators are increasingly talking about that 
country’s ‘lost three decades’ as much touted economic reforms have 
failed to deliver any meaningful degree of change.
The Shangri-La Dialogue is taking place in Singapore. In recent years 
great power tensions have become more evident at the meeting. 
This year, it coincides with a new trilateral military exercise (Exercise 
Pacific Power) between the US, Japan and Australia in the East China 
Sea. The exercise is seen by commentators as a direct response to 
the growing number and size of Sino-Russian exercises in the area, 
which in 2017 have for the first time included South Korea as an 
observer.
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The first day of the Shangri-La Dialogue is marked by a characteristically 
strong statement from the US Secretary of Defense reiterating that 
America is a ‘Pacific Power’ who, along with its allies, will ‘resist, with 
force if necessary, any and all efforts to alter the status quo in the East 
and South China Seas’. A joint statement issued by the US, Japan and 
Australia on the sidelines of the dialogue contains identical wording 
about efforts to change the status quo.
As the day progresses, however, footage appears on China’s CCTV 
television station showing Japanese vessels participating in Exercise 
Pacific Power being harassed by Chinese patrols. A Chinese General 
on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Dialogue is reportedly overhead by 
an Australian journalist saying ‘those Americans are all talk and no 
action. As we Chinese like to say, the sky is big and the emperor is 
far away.’ The conversation is almost immediately cited in an article 
posted on the Lowy Institute’s Interpreter blog.
As darkness falls and delegates from the dialogue retire for dinner 
to the Istana palace in Singapore, reports of continued harassment 
by Chinese patrols targeting Japanese ships continue. There is no 
sign of any PLA representatives at the official dinner and rumours are 
circulating that the Chinese delegation is already on its way back to 
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China in disgust at the ‘cold war’ and ‘containment’ mentality shown 
towards it during the first day of the dialogue.
At 1am, Singapore time, the Australian Defence Minister receives 
a call from his senior advisor informing him that there has been a 
collision between a US missile-guided missile destroyer participating 
in Pacific Power and a Chinese submarine. The US ship has sustained 
significant damage and lives have been lost, though exactly how many 
remains unclear at this early stage. There were several Australian 
personnel on board the ship at the time of the incident.
The Pentagon has determined that it is likely that the clash occurred 
during an attempt by the Chinese submarine to ‘snag’ the sonar array 
being towed by the US vessel. Attempts to contact the Chinese MFA 
and PLA Headquarters have gone unanswered.
SCENARIO 3. 
NON-STATE ACTORS: CRUISING FOR CONFLICT
Background
In addition to governmental forces, the presence of numerous non-
state and sub-state actors adds a further layer of complexity and 
risk to the East China Sea disputes. These include activists of various 
origin and persuasion, oil and gas firms and fishing fleets.
The highest profile case of activists landing on the disputed Senkaku/
Diaoyu islands took place in August 2012. On the 15th of that month 
– the anniversary of Japan’s surrender in the Second World War - a 
group of 14 pro-China activists arrived at the islands having sailed 
there from Hong Kong. Upon arrival, five were arrested by the 
Japanese Coast Guard for violating immigration regulations.63 Only 
a week later, however, a flotilla of approximately 100 Japanese boats 
sailed to the islands. Ten activists from this group swam ashore to 
one of the islands (Uotsori) and waved Japanese flags. The action 
prompted anti-Japanese protests in cities across China.64 In January 
2013, a ship carrying Taiwanese activists – which was accompanied 
by four Taiwanese Coast guard vessels – also made the journey to the 
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disputed islands. They were eventually repelled from the area by the 
Japanese Coast Guard.65
Due to the substantial oil and gas resources thought to lie beneath the 
East China Sea, commercial enterprises have a significant presence 
there. The fact that many of these are state owned enterprises and 
may be perceived to be motivated by strategic as well as commercial 
imperatives further complicates the picture. Recent experience in the 
South China Sea is illustrative of the destabilizing effect such firms 
can have. In May 2014, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
(CNOOC) deployed a rig in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), 
sparking a major diplomatic standoff between Hanoi and Beijing. The 
crisis was eventually resolved in July when, citing dangerous weather 
conditions, the Chinese company withdrew the rig a month before 
schedule.66 While the ongoing territorial dispute between China and 
Japan in the East China Sea has thus far prevented commercial 
exploration commensurate with the full potential of resources in 
this area, both Chinese and Japanese companies are focusing their 
efforts around the disputed Xihu/Okinawa Trough – where most of the 
East China Sea’s resource riches are thought to be. On the Chinese 
side, most exploration activity here takes the form of joint ventures 
between CNOOC and the China Petroleum and Chemical Corporation 
(Sinopec)67, meaning that an episode akin to the recent China-Vietnam 
oil rig crisis is not inconceivable in the East China Sea.
Potentially the most destabilizing non-state actors with a stake in the 
East China Sea disputes are the large numbers of fishers who earn 
their livelihood from these waters. As noted earlier, the September 
2010 collision between a Chinese fishing trawler and a Japanese 
Coast Guard vessel sparked a major diplomatic crisis between Beijing 
and Tokyo and served as a catalyst of sorts for their ongoing territorial 
dispute. With the size of Asia’s fishing fleet continuing to burgeon – 
this region now accounts for approximately three-quarters of the 
world’s total powered fishing fleet, with China’s now the largest – the 
potential for further such incidents will only increase in the future. 
And while such incidents are sometimes the result of accident or 
miscalculation rather than a reflection of genuine political intent on 
the part of national governments, the nexus between fishing fleets 
and their governments is unquestionably becoming tighter. When 
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the aforementioned Taiwanese activists travelled to the Senkaku/
Diaoyu Islands in January 2014, for instance, they were accompanied 
by four Taiwanese Coast Guard vessels. Similarly, China’s Coast 
Guard frequently comes to the aid of China’s fishing fleet and have 
even reportedly provided fishing vessels with satellite navigation and 
modern communication technology so they can inform them in the 
event they experience harassment or are going to be arrested by any 
foreign countries.68 Swarms of Chinese fishing vessels have also been 
used to prevent foreign coast guard or naval vessels from accessing 
disputed areas, such as during the May 2014 oil rig crisis.69
The Scenario
It is 18 September 2018, the anniversary of the 1931 ‘Manchurian 
incident’ in which Japanese forces blew up a bridge to create a pretext 
for their invasion of China. In recent years Beijing has ramped up the 
symbolic significance of the day with the full standing committee of 
the Politburo attending wreath laying ceremonies and other events. As 
a result it has become the focal point for the increasingly nationalistic 
strands of public propaganda in China.
In 2016, against expectations a Republican wins the presidential 
election. Central to his electoral appeal is the desire to provide some 
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backbone to American power and to stand up to what he calls in 
the campaign ‘the bullies and thugs of this world’. The long running 
coalition operations against the Islamic State (IS) have continued 
much longer than originally anticipated. Some partners have left the 
coalition and it is the latest example of the perceived weakness of 
American credibility. In seeking to reconnect with voters and make 
good on the president’s promises, the US has just issued a new 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which lays out a significant 
increase in spending after several years of contraction in the defence 
budget and returning the US to its old strategic goal of being able 
to singlehandedly fight and win two wars as and when necessary. 
However, the US has decided to increase the expectations it has for 
its many allies. For the first time the QDR spells out in detail the 
expectations that the US has for its allies including recommended 
spending increases to specific countries, and expectations, couched 
in broad terms, of contingency heavy lifting. The QDR is also couched 
in language harking back to George W. Bush administration in which 
allies are admonished to decide whose side they are on, that of ‘good 
or evil.’
In China and Japan, mutual antipathies are at an all-time high 
following a failed assassination attempt on the Japanese Prime 
Minister, by two Chinese nationals, while he was on route to pay his 
respects at the Yasukuni Shrine on 15 August.
A private Chinese company has just begun a new service offering 
cruises to give tourists an opportunity to see the Diaoyu Islands up 
close. Most of the passengers to board on 18 September are former 
PLA officers, out for the day to honour fallen comrades. The niece of 
a prominent PLA General – who is completing her doctoral studies 
in Australia – and her Australian fiancé, who works for the Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade – are also amongst the 
passengers on the cruise ship.
The Wu Liang Ye (a type of Chinese liquor) begins flowing among some 
of the passengers as the trip progresses and a former PLA Admiral 
decides that he wants to take the wheel for a while. The ship’s captain 
– whose father served under the Admiral – accedes to this request. 
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As the cruise nears the disputed islands it is approached by three 
Japanese Coast Guard vessels and asked to leave the area.
While the former Admiral has been asked to relinquish control of the 
wheel by this point, he grabs the cruise ship’s loudspeaker and, in his 
best Japanese, bellows ‘Go-banken-sama’, which means ‘Go home’ 
in Japanese. This brings a roar of approval from the deck, where a 
number of his comrades are making obscene gestures toward the 
Japanese vessels.
One of the Coast Guard Vessels begins firing its water cannon at the 
cruise ship and again requests that it leave the waters. By this stage, 
the captain of the cruise ship has called for reinforcements using 
equipment provided by the Chinese Coast Guard, fearing his arrest in 
a repeat of the September 2010 fishing boat collision.
Emboldened by the drinking, one of the former PLA officers on deck 
begins to disrobe, which brings raucous cheering and laughter from 
his colleagues, some of whom follow his lead. The Japanese Coast 
Guard vessel directs its water cannons upon this group, some of 
whom are thrown to the ground by the force of the water.
Enraged, the former Admiral yells to the captain ‘the Japanese have 
pushed us around for so many years already and you are going to let 
them do this? Give me that wheel!’ The Admiral knocks the captain to 
the ground, grabs the wheel and steers straight toward the Japanese 
vessel, forcefully ramming into its side. Smoke begins to bellow from 
the cruise ship and sirens begin to sound on the Japanese vessel.
By this time, two decommissioned frigates which are now deployed 
with the Chinese Coast Guard have reached the scene of the incident. 
One of the frigates demands the Japanese Coast Guard leave the 
area or to face the consequences if it does not.
Several minutes later, with the Japanese vessels refusing to budge, 
the frigate fires a series of warning shots. Recognizing that they would 
be outgunned in any confrontation, the Japanese vessels beat a hasty 
retreat in search of reinforcements. Jubilant, a number of the former 
PLA cruise passengers leap overboard and swim towards one of the 
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disputed islands. The cruise ship dispatches life rafts with supplies as 
well as several Chinese flags which the swimmers then plant.
These scenes are recorded by one of the Chinese frigates and within 
an hour are being beamed across China. The images prompt crowds 
of several thousand to take to the streets in over 100 Chinese cities. 
In Beijing, rocks and other projectiles are being thrown at the US, 
Japanese and Australian Embassies.
The Chinese leadership decides to send further civilians and some 
officials to the islands and to provide supplies. The PLA deploys naval 
assets to stand off the islands and the Chinese Coast Guard begins to 
interdict Japanese Coast Guard vessels’ efforts to remove the Chinese 
presence. The PLAN begins to mobilise its forces for what looks like 
a blockade of the islands from Japanese access.
CONFLICT SCENARIOS
Demonstrators in Beijing 
protesting Japan’s purchase of 
three islets that are part of the 
disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands 
- 17 September 2012.
Kyodo

CONFLICT IN THE EAST CHINA SEA: WOULD ANZUS APPLY? 52
CHAPTER 4
AUSTRALIA’S ALLIANCE DILEMMAS
Australian Risks
As the three scenarios have highlighted, tensions in the region 
are high. Conflict, while not inevitable, is a very real prospect and, 
under circumstances that are historically grounded and thus entirely 
plausible, Australia risks being drawn into an escalation cycle. Given 
Australia’s complex interests in the region, and in particular its 
important economic ties to all the protagonists, managing these risks 
is a vital task.
The scenarios have shed light on the different ways in which conflict 
may develop, from misunderstanding signals to poor communication, 
from overconfidence to plain bad luck, the triggers of conflict are many. 
But equally the scenarios have sought to emphasize that conflict will 
emerge not because of a single accident or incident, but due to the 
build-up of pressure, rivalry and fear and cycles of escalation which 
develop a logic of their own.
The stakes for Australia in an East China Sea conflict are real and 
relate both to specific circumstances – as in the case of the second 
scenario where Australian military assets are caught up in the clash 
– as well as to the broader interests of its allies and the stability of the 
region as whole. But how would the clashes detailed in the previous 
chapter draw Australia into the logic of conflict? What dilemmas does 
Australia face because of its alliance relationship? 
At least five factors will determine the likelihood of Australia being 
drawn into a conflict in the East China Sea.
Who initiates? Of particular significance are the precise 
circumstances under which conflict originates and escalates. One of 
the reasons why Australian policymakers have traditionally tended 
not to address more broad-brush hypothetical scenarios involving 
conflict – Ministers Downer and Johnston being notable exceptions 
to this convention – is that definitive judgments are often difficult, 
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if not impossible, in the absence of detailed information about just 
how conflict would unfold. The fact that China has arguably acted as 
the aggressor in the second scenario, for instance, may make the 
probability of Australian intervention even more likely than in the third 
scenario, where a case can be made that Japan was the more heavy-
handed of the protagonists and thereby responsible for provoking the 
ensuing crisis. Often, of course, the precise circumstances around the 
eruption of conflict are murky with each side apportioning blame, as 
occurs in the first scenario. However, in those situations where there 
is a clear instigator of conflict that factor is likely to have considerable 
impact upon an Australian decision to become involved.
How Does the US Respond? The greatest factor determining whether 
or not Australia became actively engaged in any dispute (apart of 
course from its own decision to do so) would derive from the way the 
US reacted to events. In each of these scenarios, a narrow reading 
of ANZUS would not oblige Australia to intervene militarily as none 
involves an ‘armed attack’ on a signatory. Although there is a remote 
chance that the second scenario, the accident leading to a loss of US 
life on board a ship, could be construed as an attack it would require 
significant diplomatic stretching for that to occur.70 But it is the broader 
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purpose of the treaty itself and the way in which the relationship has 
been increasingly understood that will likely bring the alliance into 
play. The extent to which it does will be contingent on how the US 
chooses to respond.
The US has made clear that it would do a great deal to avoid a conflict 
with China and this has been a relatively constant policy position since 
the mid-1990s, if not earlier. Under the Obama presidency caution 
about the use of force has been the order of the day. As the second 
and third scenarios intimated, however, domestic politics in the US 
has a strong bearing on foreign policy and one cannot be certain that 
the current administration’s cautious approach will continue in the 
future. An important variable therefore relates to the ways in which 
domestic political considerations are likely to influence America’s 
calculus. If a presidential administration comes to power based on 
a platform of restoring America’s global standing then the prospects 
of conflict would go up. Although it would not necessarily follow 
that pressure would be placed on Australia to become involved in a 
commensurate manner.
A second and related factor that will be crucial to determining how 
the US would respond to a conflict scenario situation would be the 
extent to which it believed that its credibility was seriously threatened if 
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it were not to become involved. For the US, a country with a remarkable 
number of alliance commitments around the world, the question of 
its credibility is extremely significant. Following President Obama’s 
April 2014 statement affirming America’s understanding that the 
disputed islands are covered by the US-Japan security treaty,71 the 
prospects that the US might well use force in each of the scenarios is 
real. Precisely what form that would take is difficult to ascertain but 
one can be confident that the US would do what it could to reduce the 
prospects of outright conflict with China. It is our view that the risk of 
conflict escalating is higher with the first two scenarios.
For Australia, a key alliance dilemma will come when the US begins 
to take steps in the event that conflict occurs. As an ally Australia will 
have the opportunity to help shape the US response, limited though that 
ability will be. One of the abiding purposes of ANZUS has been to 
increase the ability of Australians to influence key strategic decisions 
in the region. If Australia were to exercise this opportunity, however, 
it would also increase the expectation that Australia would become 
involved if the crisis deteriorated.
Perhaps the primary tactical decision for the US to make in 
relation to any East China Sea contingency is whether it would opt 
to develop a broad international coalition in response or whether it 
would maintain a narrow operational focus. Given the importance 
of China to the economies of many states around the world 
establishing a multinational approach would not be straightforward. 
The international response to the initial creation of China’s ADIZ is 
instructive here. The US, Japan and Australia singled out China as the 
destabilizing force. Others such as Britain and the EU, however, took 
a more cautious line of not apportioning blame while encouraging 
the peaceful resolution of disputes. It is likely that the US will try to 
bring as many flags as possible together in support of its actions, 
particularly if they involve a military component. Yet the difficulty it will 
face in this task will mean that the diplomatic pressure on Australia 
to support the US and Japan in their actions, both diplomatically and 
militarily, will be considerable.
Does Japan request assistance? Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo 
Abe has conducted a remarkable number of foreign forays since 
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his late 2012 return to the leadership.72 The new energy in Japanese 
foreign policy is driven by many factors, but a key component is to 
build political capital in support of Japan in its jockeying with China 
for regional and global influence. In all three scenarios, Japan is likely 
to use some of that capital to try to isolate China diplomatically and 
to enhance its own position. Australia would be among the first to 
whom Japan would turn for such support. For Canberra, the kind of 
dilemma it faces will depend on what Japan seeks. If, under these 
scenarios, the request is only for diplomatic support, then the risks 
for Australia are minimal. Although China has responded with some 
public dressing down of Australia, to date the relationship has not 
suffered in any substantive sense from the strengthening diplomatic 
links between Tokyo and Canberra.
A key question is whether Japan would formally request, even 
privately, some kind of military contribution from Australia. The 
nature of the defence and security relationship that has developed 
between Australia and Japan since the early 1990s, and particularly 
over the past decade or so, means that the likelihood of this occurring 
has increased markedly. Moreover, a further intensification of this 
relationship in future will only heighten Tokyo’s expectations of 
Australian support and potentially deepen Canberra’s East China 
Sea entrapment dilemmas. This would be particularly so were Tokyo 
to acquire the means for exerting leverage over Canberra, as some 
commentators have argued could potentially occur were Australia to 
develop any form of technological dependency as a result of acquiring 
its future submarines from Japan.73
What costs can China impose? Australia’s approach to conflict in the 
East China Sea will be shaped not just by the choices and pressures 
of Japan and the US but also by pressure exerted by China and 
the actions Beijing takes in response to Washington and Tokyo. As 
Chinese wealth has grown over recent years, Beijing has increasingly 
employed economic levers under conditions of crisis to achieve foreign 
and strategic policy goals. In the aftermath of the September 2010 
collision between a Chinese fishing trawler and a Japanese coast 
guard vessel, for instance, Tokyo reported that Beijing had blocked the 
export of rare earth elements to Japan.74 Some Australian analysts 
have argued that China’s capacity to use of economic levers has 
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often proven counterproductive and that Australia’s vulnerability to 
such coercion from its largest trading partner is limited at present.75 
While that may be so, as China’s economy continues to grow and as 
its capacity to employ economic leverage potentially improves over 
time, it cannot be assumed that Australian decisions perceived as 
counter-productive to Chinese interests in any future East China Sea 
contingency will not be cost free.
Part of the reason analysts argue that China’s economic leverage 
over Australia has been limited to date is that such moves would 
have negative consequences to the Chinese economy. There are two 
sectors in which China could have a serious influence but which would 
have little domestic economic consequence for the PRC: tourism and 
foreign students. Here China could dole out a fair amount of economic 
pain to Australia by, for example, labelling it an unfit place for travel. 
As China becomes more important for the Australian tourism industry 
this risk will only increase. While an Australian government could 
well opt to bear such costs, Beijing’s responses to conflict in the East 
China Sea will generate additional alliance dilemmas for Canberra to 
contemplate.
How much freedom of manoeuvre will Canberra have? The direct 
involvement of Australian nationals in any contingency would have a 
profound effect upon the latitude that Canberra has in responding to 
any conflict situation. This was recently demonstrated in the aftermath 
of the MH-17 air disaster, where the significant loss of Australian life 
necessitated that Canberra respond robustly and assume a leading 
role as part of the international diplomatic response.76 The same would 
almost certainly be true in the case of scenario two – particularly with 
ADF personnel caught up in the crisis – and possibly even in scenario 
three, where an Australian national (and government employee) is 
involved. The influence of social media could further limit Canberra’s 
freedom of manoeuvre in such situations, particularly if images of 
Australians suffering or evening dying are broadcast to the wider 
world.
It is conceivable that Canberra could seek to maximize its freedom 
of manoeuvre in any crisis scenario by claiming that maintaining a 
sense of distance and independence could allow it to play an ‘honest 
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broker’ role in managing and possibly even finding a solution to the 
crisis at some later point. However, this line of argument is unlikely 
to hold much water with a United States that is calling upon its allies 
to engage in more equal defence burden-sharing and that has not 
been shy over recent years of quietly accusing Canberra of free-riding 
upon their longstanding alliance relationship.77 At the same time, 
however, the statements and positions that Australian policymakers 
adopt in advance of any conflict will also condition how much freedom 
of manoeuvre Canberra has if and when crisis strikes. Hardline 
diplomatic stances such as the Australian government’s response 
to China’s November 2013 ADIZ declaration, for instance, while 
arguably designed to deter further such steps and to garner respect 
from Beijing, may ultimately make it much harder for Canberra to 
credibly do anything other than to side with the US and Japan in the 
event of an East China Sea conflict.
AUSTRALIA’S ALLIANCE DILEMMAS
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Since the ending of the Cold War a quarter of a century ago, strategic 
analysts have identified East Asia as a region that is ‘ripe for rivalry’.78 
Such pessimistic prognoses typically zeroed in on the Korean 
Peninsula and Taiwan flashpoints as those most likely to combust, 
with the potential to spark a conflict that engulfs the entire region. 
In recent years, the East China Sea has joined and potentially even 
overtaken these more traditional areas of tension as this region’s 
most dangerous.
The danger derives from many sources. China’s ambitions to be a 
maritime power, its sense of historical grievance over what it sees as 
the dispossession of its historical territories and its growing capacity 
to project military force are often cited as the precipitants of the 
tensions. But to this must be added Japan’s refusal to recognise that 
the islands are subject to dispute, a growing nationalism exhibited 
by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) of Japan, as well as the 
potential hydrocarbon wealth that lies under the seabed in the waters 
abutting the islands. Although the US has long sought to remain aloof 
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from the specifics of territorial disputes in Asia, its approach in the 
East China Sea has involved a tacit taking of sides. From the response 
to China’s announcement of an East China Sea ADIZ, in which the 
US said it opposed efforts to change the status quo, to the statement 
by President Obama in April 2014 that the islands were covered by 
the US-Japan Security Treaty, the US has indirectly backed Japan’s 
position and in so doing has hardened the lines of difference in the 
region.
While all those with a stake in the islands’ future, both those directly 
at risk of conflict and those indirectly caught up in the tensions that 
surround them, hope that the worst outcomes can be avoided one 
must recognize the hard reality that conflict in the East China Sea is 
a very real prospect. This paper has sought to show why this is the 
case, how important it is for Australia and how conflict may play out. 
Because of its vital links to the three main players Australia has a 
direct stake in any such conflict. 
The most direct way in which Australia may become embroiled 
in conflict in the East China Sea is because of its formal alliance 
relationship with the United States. And the central question of 
this project is whether ANZUS would apply in such a contingency. 
The answer to the question is mixed. The treaty was deliberately 
Foreign Affairs Minister 
Julie Bishop speaks during a 
media conference in Melbourne - 
29 September 2014. 
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written with ambiguity surrounding the operative clause (Article IV), 
technically referred to as the causus foederis. As a result a conflict 
in the East China Sea would not automatically invoke ANZUS. The 
only circumstances in which the treaty obligations would unarguably 
come into play would be an unambiguous assault on US forces, 
military installations or civilian assets based in the region. Even then, 
precisely what the invocation of ANZUS would require Australia to do 
is unclear. Unlike the operative component of NATO’s North Atlantic 
treaty which requires all members to treat an attack on one as if it 
were an attack on themselves, ANZUS only requires action to ‘meet 
the common danger’. This paper judges that it is very unlikely that a 
conflict in the East China Sea in the next five years would be of a kind 
that would automatically obligate Australia to take action because of 
the treaty.
This does not mean, however, that Australia is free of obligation in the 
event of a clash. However, it is the political and strategic dimensions 
of the alliance relationship that provide expectations that Australia 
would, under particular circumstances, have to navigate. ANZUS 
as a legal document provides the scope for policy autonomy for 
Australia, as this paper has sought to show, the ability of Australia to 
act on this will depend on how conflict unfolds, what choices the key 
powers make and Australian policymakers and politicians’ capacity to 
navigate these complex waters.
Australians, both the policy elite and public more generally, should 
recognize that there are three key aspects of the relationship that 
mean that Australia’s capacity to avoid being caught up in a conflict 
in the East China Sea is narrower than it might otherwise have been.
First, the alliance relationship with the US has been bound very tightly 
in recent years and Australia has displayed considerable enthusiasm 
in the strengthening of its links with Washington. When this is added 
to Australia’s flawless record of becoming militarily involved in every 
instance in which Washington has sought it then it is increased the 
expectations that Washington has about where Australia would stand 
in the case of a conflict.
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Second, the strategic purpose of the alliance has been broadened 
out so that it is understood by both parties now not only to be about 
the defence of their security interests narrowly understood but as a 
key mechanism to support regional peace and stability. Although of 
a lower political significance than the first factor, nonetheless this 
broadening out is not only rhetorical, it comes with expectations and 
these will come into play in any contingency in the East China Sea.
Third, Australia has been developing a closer strategic relationship 
with Japan. This has a longer run history but has been accelerated by 
the actions of the Abbott government. Australia has arguably come 
close to siding with Japan in its dispute with China over the Senkaku/
Diaoyu islands,79 it has repeatedly emphasised publically the deep 
strategic links between the two allies and looks to be the first country 
with whom Japan will have a close defence technology trading link. 
Due to this the chances of Australia being drawn into an East China 
Sea clash are higher than would otherwise have been the case.
To be clear, this increased expectation does not tie Australia’s hands 
entirely and does not mean that it will be obligated to become 
involved in a war with China. But it does mean that there will be 
some side costs that will have to be borne if allies and very close 
friends have expectations that are not met. It is also important to 
emphasise that while there is a tendency to view the US alliance link 
in the context of a putative conflict purely in terms of entanglement 
risks for Australia, it also entails opportunity. A key reason for the 
alliance’s existence has been the way in which it provides an avenue 
for influence in Washington. Australian alliance managers have been 
very successful in the past at leveraging this influence, indeed some 
insiders have remarked that it is surprising how much influence and 
access Australia has given the relatively small contribution it makes. 
Thus the alliance provides scope for Australia to shape the American 
response in ways that can be helpful for its broader interests.
This also holds for Japan, where the growing strategic intimacy 
between Canberra and Tokyo offers opportunities for influence 
perhaps not sufficiently acknowledged as yet in the Australian debate 
over the opportunities and risks associated with this deepening 
defence partnership. Perhaps the most important point to emphasise 
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is that alliances and other strategic relationships, such as that with 
Japan, are not automatic mechanisms which compel participants, 
they are instruments of statecraft which provide opportunities for 
autonomy and transformation as well as risks of entrapment. The 
key for Australia is to maximise these opportunities and reduce the 
risks of becoming ensnared in conflict.
Risks of Escalation
To do this a clear understanding of the nature of the risks Australia 
faces is needed. With the exception of the second scenario, in which 
Australian defence force personnel were directly involved in an 
accident, Australia’s potential involvement in any East China Sea 
conflict will be the result of a clash escalating and in the process 
becoming internationalised. There are many ways in which the 
militaries and non-state forces from China, Japan and the US may 
clash leading to damage and the loss of life. To date in the East China 
Sea, when incidents have occurred they have not spiralled out of 
control. This paper demonstrates that the most salient features which 
could turn a clash into an internationalised conflict are as follows:
Nationalist sentiment driving escalation. In both Japan and China, 
this dispute has the capacity to become enflamed by nationalism 
at the popular level. More importantly, the nationalist credentials of 
political leaders has the potential to constrain their policy options in a 
crisis. Nationalism is a particularly challenging phenomenon as it is 
notoriously difficult to control and makes negotiation and compromise 
extremely difficult. This is especially so in China, where the goal of 
national redemption has become so central to the legitimation of the 
rule of the Chinese Communist Party.
US concerns about credibility. Thus far the American attitude to the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute has been informed by the view that they are 
not a core US interest in the region. Unlike the South China Sea where 
issues of freedom of navigation are potentially at play, in the East China 
Sea the stakes have been largely shaped by Chinese and Japanese 
views. However, the credibility of the American role in the region and 
the value of its alliances are now part of the geostrategic calculus. 
These credibility concerns are currently only in their infancy, and the 
perceptions may be misplaced, but credibility of American power and 
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commitment is a primary interest for the US. If this becomes an issue 
in any clash then escalation risks increase.
Misjudgement about priorities and ‘redlines’. China’s approach to 
its maritime interests is the subject of intense debate. One influential 
line of thinking is that China follows a strategic logic in which it tests 
and then stretches the prevailing status quo. By behaving as if its 
claims were recognized it is slowly and incrementally trying to realize 
its ambitions. This has caused tensions in the past, most recently with 
the deployment of an exploratory oil rig off the shores of Vietnam. As 
yet, this has been contained short of conflict. In part this is because 
China has not crossed any tripwires or redlines. If, however, Beijing 
were to misperceive the priorities of the US and Japan, or if it was 
unclear about where Tokyo and Washington’s ‘redlines’ might lie, 
then the risks of escalation increase.
Leaders’ Bereft of Options. One of the greatest risks of an escalation 
of tensions between China and Japan stems from the sense that the 
leadership of both countries feels as though it is boxed in, lacking 
strategic options. In the foreseeable future, a conflict is unlikely to 
occur as a considered positive choice by one side to seize the strategic 
initiative. It would fly in the face of the taste for risk displayed to date by 
both states. But if circumstances pushed leaders in Tokyo or Beijing 
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to perceive that there were few other politically palatable choices then 
the prospects of containing a clash are reduced.
Bad decisions. Accidental clashes of the kind detailed in this paper 
can come from miscalculation, misjudgement and poor command 
and control systems. Often such clashes can be the result of basic 
human error when operating in the high pressure environment of 
a crisis. This is especially so as the skies and waters around the 
disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands become increasingly crowded and 
as militaries are operating in much greater proximity. This situation is 
complicated by the presence of third parties, often non-state actors 
such as fishing vessels and resource companies. The impact of social 
media can create a ‘multiplier effect’ with the potential to compound 
the impact of initial bad decisions by requiring policymakers to make 
their own decisions quickly on how to respond, often in the face of 
public pressure and sometimes with less than optimal information 
available to them. These risks are not mutually exclusive, indeed 
conflict escalation is only likely if several of these factors interact to 
drive a logic of conflict.
Managing Risk and Preventing Escalation: 
Policy Recommendations
Not all clashes, even those that do escalate to some degree, will force 
Canberra to show its hand in ways that could redound negatively on 
its relations with Beijing. The nature of the alliance relationship is 
such that even if the US and China end up on either side of a clash, 
Australian involvement is not automatic. That said, the principal 
challenge in managing risks of an East China Sea conflict lies in 
maintaining maximum freedom of policy manoeuvre. This means 
ensuring Australia does not over-commit too soon, thus taking a 
position in which it pays a price with Beijing unnecessarily, nor that 
it fails to uphold its end of alliance expectations. For Canberra, the 
main piece of policy preparation lies in managing the expectations of 
the US and Japan in the event of different kinds of contingencies.
The other steps that Australia can take to reduce the risks of being 
caught up in a conflict is to work alongside others in the region, both 
the direct protagonists as well as the many others who would suffer 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
67 CONFLICT IN THE EAST CHINA SEA: WOULD ANZUS APPLY?
in the event of a clash to develop better mechanisms for managing 
crises in the East China Sea.
The main risks of escalation are informational, thus the first step in 
reducing the chances of conflict is to improve communication about 
where exactly the parties stand, what the redlines entail and what 
consequences will follow from crossing these lines. Relatedly, 
protagonists need to improve day-to-communication to manage 
incidents and accidents. There is still no hotline between Tokyo and 
Beijing nor are there clear and accepted norms about incidents 
at sea or in the air in the vicinity of the disputed territories. Better 
information about both the broader strategic posture and specific 
operational priorities is vital to managing these ongoing tensions.
A related measure is to develop escalation control mechanisms. 
The febrile political environment in Northeast Asia caused by the 
heavy role that nationalism plays in the political calculus of the key 
players means that minor crises have a high escalation risk profile. 
Australia and like-minded countries should begin to develop a series 
of mechanisms that can act as off-ramps to take the heat of out 
of incidents as they occur and provide disputants with ways out of 
escalation dilemmas.
One possibility is to build upon the recently signed Code for Unplanned 
Encounters at Sea (CUES), strengthening this weak agreement to 
provide norms that signatories adhere to in the case of maritime 
crises. In particular, clarification could be sought that CUES applies in 
the disputed waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. Expanding 
the remit of CUES to the full range of military services – not just 
navies, as is currently the case – should be sought. Work could also 
begin to turn CUES into a binding crisis management agreement thus 
upgrading its current voluntary status. Taken together, these steps 
can serve to provide diplomatic breathing room to reduce tensions 
and build confidence.
Finally, Australia can use its close relationship with Japan, alongside 
the US, to try to improve the prospects of a resolution process that is 
mutually agreeable between Tokyo and Beijing. Chinese claims to the 
islands should be taken seriously and not only because the interests 
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of a great power like China have a weight that cannot be ignored, but 
also because Tokyo’s claims rest on questionable international legal 
foundations. A first step down this path is for Tokyo to accept that 
there is a dispute in the first place. Australia is in an extremely good 
position to use its close relationship to help convince Japan of the 
strategic utility of such a move.
Recognising that this will still be politically difficult for Japan, a 
first step could involve the establishment of a new second track 
process focused specifically on the East China Sea disputes that 
involves actors from across the region. To be effective the process 
would need to have some institutional foundation and a clear link to 
policy decision-making. One way to do this would be to establish a 
Track Two process under the auspices of the ADMM+. This relative 
newcomer to the regional scene would be an excellent framework 
due to its region-wide membership, its mandate to drive concrete 
forms of security cooperation and its established maritime security 
work program. In partnership with other regional stakeholders that 
do not have a direct territorial claim, but which have a strong interest 
in maintaining regional stability, Australia could play a lead role in 
initiating this process.
If Japan will not do this then the prospects of resolving this longstanding 
contest between East Asia’s two most important states is slim. For so 
long as that is the case, Australia will face the risk of being caught up 
in a conflict between two of its most important economic partners.
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